[SSTIC 2009] Day 1
First day for the 2009 conf. There are the same, the best and ... the best;) Good conf perspective. So despite a prerequisite to the pancake and the pub, I could not fail to make some comments on my blog;)
Morning
Good for 3 conf morning, I will summarize better than all the other ISS blogs, yes it is! Listen: "Following a referral problem in Massy, the train will leave with 20 minutes delay + 50 minutes late because we take the conventional routes instead tract TGV ...
Afternoon
Project WOMBAT:
The afternoon begins with a lecture entitled "The view
a WOMBAT on Internet attacks " by M. Dacier , SYMANTEC.
So before you start to know he is looking to recruit in South France (Yeah, it's nice bah even in Britain!;)) and he is looking for resources to install the "sensors". It explains it all:
presentation is divided into 3 parts: collection of information;
The information analysis and data enrichment;
threats caused by the attack.
known honeypots (or "honey pots") but here's just one of the sources used to collect information. Indeed, they also use crawlers and external flows. Honeypots are based on SGNET, the new generation of this type of solution. SYMANTEC application to install on their partners (s) machine (s) a "sensor" which is "a software entity" light. The aim is that these "sensors" are the most numerous and best possible spread in the world for more relevant results. Specifically, these sensors have a finite state machine (made known attack paths).
order for people in the community WOMBAT retrieves data, they disponsent a default gateway including proxy anonymizer for partners who send their data.
We arrive at the second stage where it performs an analysis of malicious code. We enriches the data if one already has. There are two cases of attack:
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known attacks that are easily treated and listed -
unknown attacks that need to analyze the shellcode of the attack (longer!). -
Unfortunately, the trend being targeted in the attack, we realize that the unknown and specific attacks are becoming increasingly important.
Finally, the third step: the study of threats. We saw beautiful graphics and it looks really provide results. In any case, to give some answers on the characteristics of attacks in progress or planned. For example, we have a view on the sources and targets of the attacks, their modus operandi, etc.. and full of stats.
The project is initially planned for 3 years and not yet completed. Therefore we expect different results. But the initial idea and the resources available seem to be good and promising. Only requires that data be collected:
more numerous and get relevant
- to sort the good data despite the growing volume;
- find a way to automate the analysis of malicious code attacks for unknown .
So, to follow !
Physical attacks: While
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projects laudable take place for the implementation of trusted computing. Very well except that Loïc Duflot, speaker of the conference "What limits for Trusted Computing," begins by showing us that disconnecting and reconnecting 5 times the power cable on his machine, he goes to root from an unprivileged account demo! Here, one begins to wonder what happens and everything becomes clearer in the sequel. The problem is that the BIOS is not considered at fair value. Unfortunately, we already know the damage it can do. Besides the reboot of the machine for example with a bootable media, we tackle a more complex but the result is unequivocal. So to summarize, L. DUFLOT will rely on the processing routines of the SMI (System Management Interface -
) and ACPI tables (- Advanced Configuration and Power Interface
). Interrupt routines have preferential rights and that is where the future will escalate privileges. The process involves injecting a rootkit that will run once we will operate such a routine physical (eg unplug the power cable).
In the same vein, the conf last day, "Compromise by the physical PCI bus, Christophe Devine and William VISSIAN provides us with a POC of DMA using a PCI or Cardbus. Again, the result is the appointment. This presentation was timely in continuity with that of Damien Aumaître last year, but the DMA via the firewire port this time.
ISO 27001: Already, the organization at SSTIC! it's nice too:) The approach of the conference is to see an objective (or almost) what is the ISO 27001 with a feedback of the speaker, Alexandre Fernandez-Toro. The presentation was divided into five questions:
What's the point [ISO 27001]? Is it really improves the security of information systems?
How to recognize companies that want to be certified for the buffer and those who wish to ensure they comply with good practice in terms of SSI?
What are the areas impacted?
What's the point really [ISO 27001]?
was interesting to have such feedback and say repeatedly, "I saw it." Notably, the case of companies that write documents and perform registrations just before the audit. I saw one case where the box was meant to delay the audit of six months. As if by chance, there was a lot of things put in place the last 6 months ... it's weird! No? Look at what he had been made before the 6 month ... uh ... I want a good case, even a good winner:) - The conclusion of the conference is that ISO 27001 provides a truly safe, but not in the way that one might expect a priori
- : The standard brings to companies that really have the desire to safety. It is a long-term and only and that concrete results can be obtained. In this case, the standard will streamline, and pool transversalising SSI company. In fact, that's not bad! Look
faults you find in an internal penetration test. If you dig, you realize that there is always a cause behind organizational: the machine is assigned to one administrator, the directors are in charge for 2 8278182718105 machines, etc. ... We understand why the machine is not patched for X months (who said years??) Even if you have a properly installed WSUS. For example, the cross will cover the entire SI and prevent a machine being administered ... that by itself! -
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