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[HITB Conference] Day 2

The first day was full of vulnerabilities and farms. After visiting a few Amsterdam (no no, I was not part of the group went to the red zone) including a visit to the Anne Frank house (right now, it's less sexy;). I have not attended the second keynote but here is the result of the conferences that I attended.


Conf 1 - SAProuter, An Internet Window to your SAP platform - Mariano Croce di Numez

True to my story about SAP is the final conference subject. This conference focuses on the component SAP Router and was very convenient because presentation of SAP, a demonstration of the attack by step we have been presented. For those not familiar with SAP, I refer you to the summary of the training that took place the first two days of HITB ( Summary 1 Summary 2 and ).

must remember above all that the SAP router's role is to filter requests (layers 3 and 4), draw connections, to apply security on the flow (with a shared key) and secure the flow ( with SNC).

For filtering applications, a table used to define flows permitted and prohibited limited (ie, only flows with the SAP protocol are allowed). First potential flaw: Administrators, in real life, they often end configuration with a "I authorize all." Indeed, on the basis of a whitelist , administrators do not always have the courage to enter all the access and knowing he's got to walk at all costs ...

The demonstration was conducted using the tool BIZPLOIT (whose speaker is the main developer). The attack takes place in several stages:
  • discovery phase: we look for the port used by SAP Router. By default, the port TCP/3299 but we check with the module "discover"
  • internal discovery phase: the plugins SAProuter Spy allows us to know open ports on the machine as if we were there! Interesting;
  • the attack is to use the SAP Router as a proxy. We find that both information about the SAP solution (eg, version);
  • Then it uses the plugin to find bruteforce valid accounts (eg default passwords or trivial);
  • We use the saprouterAgent feat to get a connection on SAP Router;
  • Finally, thanks to the tool tsocks that our traffic will be redirected to the proxy set up and we can attack the system from within SAP as .
A convincing demonstration that highlight the risks of poor security of its SAP platform. The correction solutions exist:
  • application patches (unfortunately not always obvious);
  • application security on connections (maximum number of connections, encryption, etc.).
  • policy word password for clients
  • generalization error messages to prevent the posting of information technology.

Conf 2 - Firefox 4 and Opportunities for Security Research - Chris Hofmann

I will not dwell on that which did not confer any interest expected. The idea is to launch a "Bug Bounty Program . More specifically, it is to reward people who discover bugs on the next version of Firefox (Firefox 4 then). Already exists in reality but the emphasis is on the subject to motivate potential researchers by giving them a higher bonus ($ 3,000). However, the bug must complete several conditions such as driving a remote exploit. Problem: black markets still offer more. However, you would like to supply weapons to black hats, even for money?

Finally, Mozilla believes that if he does not pay to search for bugs now, they will pay more one way or another, the discovery of bugs. This is true for any software, but rarely seen ... At the same time, Mozilla aims to ensure the safety of its users. In addition, the foundation in question wants to find ways to cope with bugs:
  • assuming the potential bugs;
  • motivating researchers to find these bugs;
  • correcting them quickly.
This is a real challenge for Firefox 4 will have new functionality (such as parsing HTML 5), which may also represent new attack vectors ...


Conf 3 - xprobe-NG , Efficient Building Network Discovery Tools - Fyodor YAROCHKIN

There are already many discovery tool. So why a new one? One proposed by Fyodor already existing (Xprobe) is to consider the real-life attacks that take place on the Net. This tool of fingerpringting also aims to expand his work at the application layer to combine the collection of information for network and application layers. Finally, this new version aims to enrich the previous version by using scripts and data traffic.

Several challenges are so committed to meet this challenge. In particular, you must:
  • limit the processing time of network layers, the application layer being greedy for interpretation
  • be fast enough to analyze the flow in real time (or almost), what can be done with a new engine.
tool written in Python, uses the principle of scoring and prioroté to treat most important information first. Then another solution is to run the analysis modules when they are needed.

Finally, xprobe-NG will perform various tests to analyze the application as directory separators, special files in a directory, the sensitivity of case, etc. ... to differentiate Linux from a Windows.

Further improvements are planned to allow the tool to stand out. A first version will be available next week to address this .


Conf 4 - Top 10 Web 2.0 Attacks and exploits - Shreeraj Shah

At this conference, the speaker took into account the Top 10 vulnerabilities related to Web 2.0 based on OWASP. Here are the standings:
  • 1) DOM Based XSS (Ajax);
  • 2) SQL Injection (SOAP / XML)
  • 3) Blind SQL over JSON / AMF
  • 4) XPATH Injection;
  • 5) Business logic bypass;
  • 6) Decompilation Attack (ex: SWF)
  • 7) WSDL
  • 8) XSS with flash;
  • 9) CSRF with XML;
  • 10) Widget / Marshup.

A description and demonstration was conducted for each of these attacks. Any explanation would therefore require a ticket all by itself (at least) but this interesting presentation called especially on the eve that we must achieve as pentesters on these new attacks. Indeed, many sites are affected by this type of vulnerabilities not well known developers.


Conf 5 - The traveling Hacksmith 2009/2010 - Saumil SHAH

A special presentation that was interesting and made it more of a laugh: it was not be an operator or agent-Fi operator Travel in the room ...
Let me explain! The announcer tells us that travel a lot and everything is paid and often expensive as WiFi connections in hotel rooms.

Through various trips and hotels visited, Saumil shows us how he managed to get Internet access free or cheaper. The change of room number in the application to control the gateway through SQL injections, no access to him has survived;)

Then he attacked the tickets in order to be upgraded . He succeeded on several occasions by modifying his seat number in the choice of seats at check-in on the Internet.

Finally, a site for hotel reservations that I should not mention and that I would not , it is possible to book and cancel without paying fees: unless the cancellation is made on previous day of arrival! To see if it still works?


And it's the end of this conference! These four days have passed very quickly but it is time to leave Hackerland and find his home: Finally, if the Thalys arrives, already 30 minutes late ...

Guy Public Masterbation Bus 6

[HITB Conference] Day 1

A small return on the first HITB day conference in Amsterdam where the atmosphere is very good, cool hotel (except apparently for sleeping?) HITB and girls are ... sociable! Besides, when SSTIC girls?


Keynotes - Dr. Anton CHUVAKIN - Security Chasm

This conference reminds me of a talk given by Nicolas RUFF last year in SSTIC. Indeed, an idea in all this is to show the failure of security since the 90s.

First, we crossed several time security by moving the finally problem every time. Firstly, security was focused on computers and networks, and on prevention and on compliance and standards, etc. ...
In parallel, we wanted to meet local risks initially and external threats (with the firewall at all is) and then attack detection (mode of IDS / IPS) and more recently, cybercrime and come now to the period of clouds.

The problem, according to the speaker, the lack of consistency in all this. There is one hand those who advise and make safety recommendations when providing the they do not touch the hardware (the listener does mastery has never given that IPS will advise you to configure a particular way for example to better protect the network) and secondly, we people who apply the security because it must be so or because they are asked, not realizing the risks.

So to solve this, several guidelines are provided to us. For example, standards can be beneficial but only to oversee the implementation of security in an IS, not for the label "compliant" in particular.

In fact, in his view, if a company is unable to ensure his safety in 2020, she will die because an attacker will by then all weapons allowing it to terminate the business of an enterprise.


Conf 1 - John 'Kanen' Flowers - Introducing Kane this is where the speaker has the right idea: to offer a security solution that is not only a new software but a box "turnkey". For work in security, you will tell me that it already exists: many publishers offer ... yes but at what price? At $ 475 you know how? Indeed, the basic price of a housing Kane current problems to implement security. And you can do with this solution? It is a virtual box together the following characteristics:

an operational module (sniffer packet analyzer + + cracker passwords + exploit scripts);

a detection module (for detection of network attack);

a firewall (to inspect packets and block them);

a router (which can benefit of filtering rules);
    a host-based mode (to cooperate with anti- virus and firewall machines). The idea
  • is good and it would be interesting to see what this could lead in practice.
  • In the meantime, I invite you to see the product page
  • for more info.
Conf 2 - Alexander POLYAKOV -
Attacking SAP users with SAPSPLOIT


I continue my adventure on the security of SAP (see
traning1 and training2 ). Here, he assumes that the SAP system is properly secured and attack vectors on your system (OS, DB, app, additional services) are not usable from our point of attack. Which, for a recent version of the platform would possible. At least admit that. So the attack vector will be the user. Indeed, he will have the appropriate permissions to connect to the SAP server and once the workstation compromise, we have the opportunity to attack us in the heart of our target. In addition, many users are therefore more likely to succeed. The user connects to SAP via the SAPGUI client. First point: the flows are not always encrypted and only the most compressed (XOR with a known key, base64, ...).
Second point: SAPGUI is vulnerable to a number of attacks:
a) SAPGUI uses ActiveX and then vulnerabilities regarding the latter also apply to our target (eg buffer overflows are possible). Also, ActiveX enable interactions with files stored on the server: what if we changed the server configuration to remove protections? Finally, it is possible to execute system commands or deploy a Trojan horse. b) Once the client is compromised, it is possible to find interesting data on the victim's computer. By default, we will find them in the directory
c: \\ windows \\ sap
.

c) often promising more attacks may be carried on Client: XSS (stored in a particular XSS upload function), phishing, XSRF, etc. ...
    d) It is even possible to get a shell by uploading an HTML page in a function to upload the client.
  • To prevent this type of attack, here are some recommendations provided by Alexander:
  • Make the necessary updates: the latest versions are much better protected
  • Test the strength of the passwords of customers and apply a threshold of failure for the connection attempt;
  • Some configurations at the registry key used to secure the best customer

Attention at midnight, an option allows all users Delock! Delete.
  • Some extra info can be found here
  • .
  • Conf 3 - Laurent Oudot -
Web in the Middle - Attacking Client


The first conference in the afternoon we talked about MITM attack that we know all but one type more particularly be called
WITM . In fact, this is to operate on public networks and so do Wi-Fi ... you just think! Opposite, we all mobile devices capable of connecting via Wi-Fi In particular, we have smartphones and anything that crunches ([Top-joke] Yes Fred, I decided to resume the contest yesterday [End private joke];)).

I selected two main ideas for the conference: During a so-called secured via SSL, all queries are not always sent securely. Indeed, the login page to the user aborts, we can find HTTP
. This may relate to the checkout pages;
We can change the user-agent in our requests
and see the behavior of the website which may be different for some.
  • From these two ideas, that gave birth to 0day submitted to us by the speaker. Associated references are:
  • CVE-2010-1752 for the iPhone;
  • CVE-2010-0028 for HTC's browser (Opera);
  • CVE-2010-0027 for the blackberry ( vulnerability in the "hotspot browser");

The demonstration involved a live vulnerability in this time last iPad. A vulnerability in the browser (Safari) allows for crash for now and maybe more later.
    There were certainly a lot of work behind it to find and exploit vulnerabilities. Unfortunately, no explanation has been provided thereon. No technical issue has been addressed either. Although understandably overlooked by manufacturers, it has removed spice to the presentation.
  • Conf 4 - Niels TEUSINK - Owned Live on Stage: Hacking Wireless Presenters


This time, the presentation that followed was very explicit in his explanation and demonstration! Moreover, this is a subject quite original:
hacking through wireless devices
!
A priori, any wireless device could serve us come into the crosshairs. First, we connect a USB wireless device (a device Logitech R-R0001 for presentation) on two different PCs. A PC is the machine of the attacker and the other that of the target. And you understand, we'll try to make connect wireless devices them to compromise the target machine!
I'll spare you the technical details of these physical attacks: it's just my area and am not able you learn something about it. However, the attack technique is initially to sniff through the BUS
with the proper equipment. On the other hand, the speaker chooses a wireless device a bit different. To summarize, the goal will be to find the right communication channel
allowing us to communicate between two devices. Once the channel is found, the devices are "connected" and there, the announcer tells us what he can do:
a connect-back on the VNC on the target machine . I can just confirm that it worked well during the demonstration! It's pretty scary right? And there this is not a wireless mouse that you hold in your hand? ...
Today, security does not exist for the devices in question, so it is important to create a secure protocol and use a reliable cryptography to prevent such attacks.
Conf 5 - Tamas Rudner - Fireshark

The announcer presents here a plugin for Firefox. One more! But especially since it allows
map sites infected with malware
. For this plugin visit the web pages and collects information they need (source code, redirects, screenshots, etc..).
Another goal is désobfusquer code, which will study the malware encountered on the sites.

The tool can operate in two modes
:
the Network mode: either automatic mode;

the Single-user mode: the user chooses the sites it wishes to inspect;
    The last feature that has not been mentioned is the post-processing. The aim is to analyze malware from previously collected evidence.
  • Since malware are becoming more numerous, this plugin is quite the place among the tools of a researcher. Indeed, besides the role of prevention
  • (thus avoiding contaminated sites to visit), the analysis of malware can
  • understanding new attacks and to find the cons-measures.

end of that first day. Following in the following note.