Second and last day of training on SAP security. Many things but it's still quite interesting. We continue our tour!
The authentication security
On SAP systems, it is possible to connect several different ways. In particular, it is possible to connect:
via a login / password (classical); SNC (Secure Communication nework) can connect to using an external library ( eg NTLM)
- via a certificate
- ; by
- ticket (as part of an authentic 'by including SSO;
- PAS (Pluggable Authentication Service): use of another base 'authentic' (eg LDAP) Well, we should this is not the choice that is missing. Afterwards, they are not all equal in terms of reliability ...
- safety of users
user. The type assigned depend on the connection and the expected safety. For example, type
Dialog allows direct access to SAP. This is not the case for the type system
but it requires a password that does not expire. An Unusually, there are quite a few default accounts
on an SAP system. Obviously, it is recommended lock the accounts in question or at least, to change passwords. The privileged account is SAP *. Hey, I think we saw that the account had a password by default trivial ... Moreover, this account can not be deleted! However, there are ways to secure such access.
policy passwords
encoding passwords has evolved as and versions of SAP. Today, most complexes are hashed with SHA1 and receive a random salt. The precedents are breakable
patched with john. Then all parameters are conventional and expected (blocked account, password history, expiration, etc..).
Permissions
A user logged in can not (always) do whatever he wants. it is subject to authorization. Checks are performed before a user can perform a transaction (as defined in SAP) for example. A user with the profile
sap_all
is most interesting for an attacker, in effect, it can perform any action.
Safety Communications
An attacker can have fun to interact with the protocols used by SAP for information on the system or exploit vulnerabilities. these include:
RFC : Starts functions on remote servers;
External Commands: SAP allows a transaction to interpret system commands (on the operating system) .
- security environments
- In SAP, we find three primary instances:
environment Development (DEV);
environment qualification (QAS)
- environment
- production (PRD).
- Even though it is separate instances, they are connected to a single base ( common transport directory ). It is possible cloissoner rights between these environments and within the base. Thus, a developer can not affect the integrity of production data for example. Configuration is done via SAP transaction.
miscoded A module may allow attacks critics. In this case, they can afford to bypass the restrictions of rights applied to a user. This language can also be used to execute SQL commands and recover data (bypass authorization checks (see above)).
few hidden doors to the holy grail
There are several points of entry that an attacker will be happy to use to reach its target. These are services that, when activated, provides a Web interface
to be more or less well protected ... (Who said it could be accessible from the Internet??;)
It may particularly affect the application via the administration interfaces often poorly protected (according to some research on google ...).
http://serveur:port/chemin_vers_WGate/service/!?variable
http://serveur/scripts/wgate/webgui!? ~ Client = 000 http://serveur:port/chemin_vers_WGate/admin /!
- Conclusion
- 're done for training. I have not been exhaustive but I think I have provided a good overview. Here especially given the different security points to be addressed for securing an SAP system ... or vectors attack for an attacker. We will not talk without SAP are intended for two confer on the subject. Also, I hope you find the opportunity to experience a return on an audit to illustrate this theory in practice:)
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