After SSTIC, we chain HITB with Amsterdam and this time I'll try to keep up during the four days to update my blog daily. Enrolled in training SAP Security, I will take this opportunity to give you an overview of these first two days. Later, I will give you a practical example;)
What does the beast?
SAP ERP is used by a lot of business because basically, it allows you to manage production from beginning to end. By cons, it's heavy to put in place and safety is rarely a priority integrators. Nothing new is often like that. But it also just means that there are ways to have fun;
is represented by the SAP system containing the particular database (eg Oracle); In this database, there are usually some very interesting things: p;
To connect to the SAP platform, we bind with
customers to consider as a gateway
SAP Router
For starters, the SAP Router
. We will find typically on port TCP/3219. Including the ability to filter the IPs allowed to communicate with SAP customers. 3 permission levels are available: D
deny; P allowed;
and S to allow only flows SAP (which is circumvented ...) By default, this component works Whitelist, which is a good point ... unless the director finally put an equivalent rule to "permit any any
The WebDispatcher
. But the password is randomly generated. You can always try to find the password : The administration interface is found at the following address:
http://host:port/sap/wdisp/admin/default.html
The WebDispatcher may have other functions such as load balancing (load balancing) and encryption of communications (from end to end or not depending on whether one wishes to analyze the flow for example).
Finally, an example configuration file (we find the P and D respectively for
Permit and Deny
P / sap / authorized.cgi D *. php D * The SAP security in general
To attack the SAP instances, we need two elements: the instance ID (SAPID)
an account (username / password).
Regarding the first element, it is generally the same as the instance of the database. If we find it, we would more than likely have the desired item.
As auditors, it exists by default. Indeed, apart from three SAP customers created by default, others will be generated for login / password:
The architecture has a SAP database and a system operating at least on the underlying database. Several solutions can be implemented: Oracle, Informix, for example side database. Linux OS and Windows side. These key elements within the architecture should also be secure.
There is much to say and it is not strictly specific items mentioned. We do not detail these points but it is important to note that they must be treated so as not to be the weak links of the architecture implementation.
Petite conclusion
We begin to address the security of SAP, while seeing some potential avenues of attack during our explanations.
To facilitate the task of an auditor (or an attacker ...), there are platforms such as audit
BIZSPLOIT
I will certainly speak to you and that I will SAPSPLOIT also since conf will be dedicated.
customers to consider as a gateway
- actually. Concretely, we can use as an interface connection
- SAPGUI and address these customers. You go get this tool and you'll realize that it pays. And as you do not come to the idea of using a version Cracked, there is actually a JAVA version for free here
- ;
- It is possible to connect from outside the SAP customers. In this case, one or two layers interposed: SAP Router and Webdispather. We will discuss these elements further; SAP, it's still very complex and when it works it well. That's why security is often overlooked ... Despite all this, I do not want you to be lost. I propose to add a schema.
- The SAP security (usually from external)
-
SAP Router
For starters, the SAP Router
. We will find typically on port TCP/3219. Including the ability to filter the IPs allowed to communicate with SAP customers. 3 permission levels are available: D
deny; P allowed;
and S to allow only flows SAP (which is circumvented ...) By default, this component works Whitelist, which is a good point ... unless the director finally put an equivalent rule to "permit any any
- " because he lacks the courage to write all the permissions and again, it has to forward all!
- For each rule, we can associate with the IP (or IP address range) allowed a password (shared key). To be more clear, here is a sample rules file:
- S 192.168.1 .* SAProuter password
- D * * * * *
The WebDispatcher
This time, we address the application layer. Like the SAP Router, the WebDispatcher will operate from a whitelist for URLs, but this time allowed (not IPs / services).icmadm
There is a default account that may be interesting to know:
. But the password is randomly generated. You can always try to find the password : The administration interface is found at the following address:
http://host:port/sap/wdisp/admin/default.html
The WebDispatcher may have other functions such as load balancing (load balancing) and encryption of communications (from end to end or not depending on whether one wishes to analyze the flow for example).
Finally, an example configuration file (we find the P and D respectively for
Permit and Deny
):
P / sap / authorized.cgi D *. php D * The SAP security in general
SAP Instances
To attack the SAP instances, we need two elements: the instance ID (SAPID)
an account (username / password).
Regarding the first element, it is generally the same as the instance of the database. If we find it, we would more than likely have the desired item.
As auditors, it exists by default. Indeed, apart from three SAP customers created by default, others will be generated for login / password:
- SAP * PASS
- Other components
The architecture has a SAP database and a system operating at least on the underlying database. Several solutions can be implemented: Oracle, Informix, for example side database. Linux OS and Windows side. These key elements within the architecture should also be secure.
There is much to say and it is not strictly specific items mentioned. We do not detail these points but it is important to note that they must be treated so as not to be the weak links of the architecture implementation.
Petite conclusion
We begin to address the security of SAP, while seeing some potential avenues of attack during our explanations.
To facilitate the task of an auditor (or an attacker ...), there are platforms such as audit
BIZSPLOIT
I will certainly speak to you and that I will SAPSPLOIT also since conf will be dedicated.
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